Tag Archives: hero worship

The Importance of Humanizing Heroes and Villains

By Scott T. Allison

Human beings have a remarkable talent for turning other people into something larger—or smaller—than human. When someone performs an extraordinary act of courage or compassion, we may elevate them into a saint, smoothing away flaws and imagining a purity no real person possesses. And when someone commits terrible acts, we may transform them into a monster, a creature fundamentally unlike us. Both impulses are understandable. Both distort reality.

My colleague Mohsen Askari calls the corrective to hero worship hero fallibilization, which he defines as the recognition that admirable people are imperfect. Oskar Schindler saved more than a thousand Jews during the Holocaust, an achievement worthy of deep respect. Yet Schindler was also complicated and flawed. Acknowledging those imperfections doesn’t debunk his heroism; it simply allows us to admire without idealizing and critique without cancelling.

If heroes benefit from fallibilization, villains have a parallel process: villain humanization. The phrase can sound unsettling. Why humanize people responsible for horrific acts? Because humanization is not exoneration.

Consider Adolf Hitler. We can acknowledge that he loved classical music, showed affection toward people in his inner circle, and displayed other recognizably human qualities. None of these facts remotely counterbalances the millions of deaths and immeasurable suffering for which he bears responsibility. Seeing someone’s human traits doesn’t lessen the weight of their wrongdoing. To humanize Hitler is not to soften our judgment. It is to confront the far more disturbing truth that he was human.

Calling perpetrators of extraordinary evil “monsters” can paradoxically make evil easier to live with. Monsters belong to another category. If evil is committed only by creatures unlike us, then ordinary people need not look too closely at themselves. The famed psychologist Philip Zimbardo spent much of his career challenging this comforting assumption, showing how situations, institutions, and group pressures can lead ordinary people toward actions they once considered unimaginable. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn captured the same truth when he wrote that the line between good and evil runs through every human heart.

The dynamic works in the opposite direction as well. When we turn heroes into gods, extraordinary goodness becomes something only extraordinary beings can achieve. Askari argues that hero worship can shrink our own sense of agency. We admire from below rather than asking what parts of the hero’s behavior might be available to us. Fallibilizing heroes changes the message: an imperfect person like me may be capable of extraordinary good. That realization is aspirational.

Humanizing villains delivers the complementary warning: a recognizably human person like me may be capable of participating in harm. That realization is humbling—and protective.

Together, these insights reveal four ways we construct morally significant people. At one extreme is hero worship, where admirable individuals become godlike. Moving toward complexity brings hero fallibilization, where heroes remain inspiring but recognizably imperfect. On the darker side lies villain humanization, where we condemn terrible behavior while acknowledging the humanity of the wrongdoer. At the far extreme is villain demonization, where the perpetrator becomes a monster. The endpoints—god and monster—are psychologically seductive because they compress complicated people into simple moral essences. The middle positions ask more of us.

Carl Jung’s theory of archetypes offers another lens. Humans naturally organize experience through powerful images of heroes, shadows, saviors, and demons. These archetypes can illuminate reality, but they can also overwhelm it. Mature perception requires remembering that the archetype is not the person.

This is why humanizing both heroes and villains matters. Hero worship and villain demonization allow us to locate extraordinary good and extraordinary evil somewhere outside ourselves. Fallibilization and humanization return them to the human family. Fallibilizing heroes makes goodness less remote. Humanizing villains makes evil less alien.

One realization should give us hope. The other should make us vigilant. Together they remind us of an uncomfortable but empowering truth: the capacities for extraordinary good and extraordinary evil do not belong to different species of people. They belong to us.

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Statues Controversy Suggests There Are No Heroes, Only Heroic Actions

By Scott T. Allison

In Sweden, there is a fascinating statue of a woman named Danuta Danielsson who became a hero in 1985 when she used her purse to clobber a white Nazi supremacist while he marched in a right-wing rally.

What makes her statue unique among hero statues is that it captures her performing the heroic act of swinging her purse. It’s entirely an action-shot, a big departure from the universal practice of constructing hero statues intended to portray individuals as heroes. Danielsson’s statue isn’t about her as a person; it’s about her one specific act of courage that day.

Heroism, it could be argued, describes an action, not a person.

All around the world, and especially in the United States, statues of slave traders, warriors, and profiteers are toppling to the ground. Once revered as heroes, these statued individuals have been exposed as villainous human rights violators.

With this in mind, Danuta Danielsson’s statue should be one that remains uncontroversial. Her statue portrays a heroic act that can withstand any scrutiny into her character.

What did we know about Danielsson’s character? We know that her mother had survived a concentration camp during World War II. Danielsson knew the horrors of the Nazi menace and took action on that April day in Sweden.

But like all human beings, Danielsson had a dark side. That aspect of her character, however, is irrelevant to her heroic act of clobbering a marching Nazi, an image nicely captured by her statue in vivid heroic detail.

Perhaps there should be no hero statues, only heroic action statues. Many of our tarnished heroes performed untarnished heroic actions. It’s those behaviors that we admire, those courageous, risky, selfless actions that forever made a positive difference for society.

For example, let’s see a statue of Thomas Jefferson composing the Declaration of Independence. Such a statue acknowledges Jefferson’s heroic action without any idolatry of the man, without any of vitriol about whether he’s deserving of the status of “hero”.

Today we see statues of Confederate generals, Christopher Columbus, slave traders, and Spanish conquistadors toppling to the ground. Roads and schools named after these individuals are also being changed. We are reminded that a hero is a social construction, tied to the norms and values of a particular era.

Heroic actions, in contrast, are more likely to transcend human time periods. While all humans are flawed and perhaps not deserving of adoration, a morally sublime act is pure and transcendent.

The famous German author and poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe once wrote, “The deed is everything, the glory is naught.” In building our statues, let’s remember that actions not only speak louder than words, they may outshine — and outlast — the person performing the action.

Shunryu Suzuki, the famed Zen monk and teacher, once said that there are no enlightened people. There are only enlightened actions.

It seems obvious that enlightenment or lack of enlightenment, whether in a person or in an action, is better viewed as a continuum rather than as an all-or-nothing quality. Some people and some actions reflect more enlightenment than others. Seeing subtlety and nuance is a hallmark trait of heroic consciousness.

People are more likely to disagree about who a hero is than about what specific action is heroic. For that reason, let’s honor and celebrate heroic actions that can inspire us all to behave heroically.

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Scott T. Allison is Professor of Psychology at the University of Richmond. Another version of this article appears in Psychology Today.

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